RESTRICTIONS ON COMMUNICATION BY
CLASS ACTION PARTIES AND
ATTORNEYS
Many have criticized the class action device, claiming that it invites abuse by class members and their opponents, as well as by counsel
for both sides. In particular, critics have noted that attorneys may solicit class action clients or fees and that parties and their attorneys may
misrepresent the benefits or drawbacks of a class action in order to encourage potential class members to opt out or remain in the suit. In
response to these potential abuses, the Federal Judicial Center has
promulgated a suggested local rule requiring that parties and their attorneys obtain court approval prior to communicating. with potential
class members.' Several district courts have adopted this proposed
rule, and other district courts have used the rule as a model for orders
issued in particular cases.
This Comment will survey abuses of the class action device, as
well as the orders and rules used to prevent them. It will then examine
challenges to the statutory authority of district courts to promulgate
such rules and orders, and the constitutional challenges to "gag orders." Finally, this Comment will discuss alternatives to gag orders
and consider whether these alternatives can be both effective and constitutional.
I.

REGULATING COMMUNICATION IN CLASS ACTIONS: PRESENT
APPROACHES

A.

PotentialCommunication Abuses in Class Actions.

Many legal scholars believe that the class action device is particularly subject to abuse by both class and nonclass parties. 2 The Manual
for Complex Litigation discusses four prevalent class action communication abuses:
(1) solicitation of direct legal representation of potential and actual
THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (1978) [hereinafter cited as
MANUAL].
1. MANUAL pt. H, § 1.41.
2. See, e.g., MANUAL pt. L § 1.41, at 46-47; 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.02[1] (2d
ed. 1979); Simon, ClassActions-Useful Tool or Engine of.Destruction, 7 LINCOLN L. REV. 20, 35-

37 (1971).
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class members who are not formal parties to the class action; (2) solicitation of funds and agreements to pay fees and expenses from potential and actual class members who are not formal parties to the
class action; (3) solicitation by defendants of requests by class members to opt out in class actions under subparagraph (b)(3) of Rule 23;
and (4) unauthorized direct or indirect communications from counsel
or a party, which may misrepresent the status, purposes and effects of
the action and of court orders therein and which may confuse actual
and potential class members and create impressions which 3may reflect adversely on the court or the administration of justice.

Attorney solicitation of clients, funds, and fee agreements is one of
the most prevalent perceived evils of the class action procedure. The

class action device, with its potential for tremendous legal fees, encour-

ages attorneys to seek out litigants. 4 Further, as one court has noted,

since Rule 235 makes recourse to the courts convenient when it would
class action litigation and
otherwise be infeasible, that rule encourages
6

thus invites even more solicitation.
have discussed the problem of attorneys'
Numerous recent cases
7
"stirring up" litigation.

In addition to the traditional fear that such

solicitation will encourage baseless, harassing litigation, courts fear that
solicitation will harm the solicited client.8 The Code of Professional

Responsibility reflects the courts' concerns by forbidding client solicitation.9 This in turn encourages courts to inveigh even more heavily
3. MANUAL pt. I, § 1.41, at 46.
4. Simon, supra note 2, at 35-37; see Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments ofthe FederalRulesof CivilProcedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 398 (1967) (noting

that requirement of notice to class makes it difficult to preserve "a general tone which will not lend
itself to unseemly solicitation of clients").
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.

6. Cotchett v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
7. See, eg., Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1972) (attorney for association of franchisees mailed letters of solicitation to franchisees seeking potential
class members for suit against franchisor); Graybeal v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7
(D.D.C. 1973) (class certification denied when the named class parties were also the class attorneys); Carlisle v. LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 237 (N.D. Tex. 1972) (attorney filed individual action, then offered to file a class action if other shareholders wished to join); Buford v.
American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1251 (N.D. Ga. 1971) ("ITlhe plain truth is that in many
cases Rule 23(b)(3) is being used as a device for solicitation of litigation"); Shields v. Valley Nat'l
Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448 (D. Ariz. 1971) (class action not permitted when the named plaintiff was also
attorney for the class; such action seen as a questionable method of soliciting legal business).
8. The potential harms to the solicited client include "undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, conflict of interest, and lay interference [with the conduct of
litigation]." In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978).
9. [Advice to take legal action] is improper if motivated by a desire to obtain personal
benefit, secure personal publicity, or cause legal action to be taken merely to harass or
injure another. A lawyer should not initiate an in-person contact with a non-client, personally or through a representative, for the purpose of being retained to represent him
for compensation.
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against the evil of solicitation.' 0
In several cases the named plaintiff, rather than his attorney, has
attempted to persuade other potential class members to participate in
the suit.II The advantage to the plaintiff is that legal fees may then be
shared with the additional class members. 12 Indeed, sharing legal expenses may be the only means of obtaining court access for cases in
which the potential individual recovery is small.13 Unless litigants with
small claims are able to join together to achieve economies of scale,
legal fees and court costs will normally exceed any individual recovery.
In addition to making more suits economically feasible, persuading
others to join a class action may enhance chances for settling claims
without the expense of litigation. 14 Despite these potential benefits to
plaintiffs with worthwhile suits, however, courts have, for fear of stirring up baseless litigation and abusing the judicial process, disapproved
of parties' soliciting additional class members.' 5
The drafters of the Manual also feared that the party opposed to
the class might solicit potential class members to opt out. The spectre
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-3 (1978).
Disciplinary Rule 2-104(A)(5) of the Code is of special relevance in the class action context:
"If success in asserting rights or defenses of his client in litigation in the nature of a class action is

dependent upon the joinder of others, a lawyer may accept, but shall not seek, employment from
those contacted for the purpose of obtaining their joinder." Id. DR 2-104(A)(5) (emphasis added).

Courts, however, have been unwilling to impose sanctions upon attorneys under this rule when
the attorneys are not motivated by pecuniary considerations. See, e.g., Halverson v. Convenient
Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927, 931 (7th Cir. 1972) ("A lawyer whose client will benefit from

joinder of others similarly situated may seek out claimants if his motive is not to secure fees for
himself").
The limits of the ethical constraints imposed by the Code are not always clear. For instance,
the Code provides generally that a lawyer who has advised a layman to obtain counsel or take
legal action may not accept employment stemming from that advice; however, "[a] lawyer may
accept employment by ... one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client." ABA CODE,
su~pra DR 2-104(A)(1). This provision has been utilized to find that a lawyer who sent letters
requesting that other members of an association join a proposed class action did not act unethicaly. The court found that the attorney, retained to represent the association on another matter,
could reasonably believe that all association members were his clients. Halverson v. Convenient
Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d at 930.
10. See note 7 supra.
11. See, e.g., Coles v. Marsh, 560 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977).
12. See J.M. Woodhull, Inc. v. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., 62 F.R.D. 58 (S.D. Ohio
1974).
13. See generally Ford, FederalRule 23:. A DeviceforAiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 501 (1969).
14. See text accompanying notes 16-19 infra.
15. See, e.g., J.M. Woodhull, Inc. v. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., 62 F.R.D. 58 (S.D.
Ohio 1974) (denial of class certification proper on ground that named plaintiff solicited class members with intent of sharing expenses). But see Coles v. Marsh, 560 F.2d 186 (3d Cir.) (party solicitation of potential class members, while perhaps ethically impermissible, serves to effectuate
purposes of Rule 23), cer. denied,434 U.S. 985 (1977).
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of long and complex class action litigation and a potentially large class
recovery may well encourage the potential defendant to attempt to pre-

vent the certification of the opposing class. 16 One means of preventing
certification is to decrease the number of potential class members will-

ing to join in the suit so that the "numerosity" requirement of Rule 2317
will not be met. This strategy can be effected by reaching settlements

with individuals,' or, ideally, by convincing potential class members
simply to opt out or release their claims.19
Rule 23's natural tendency to encourage the potential defendant to
solicit opt-outs, releases, and settlements is heightened by the context in
which many class suits are brought. Class actions are often brought by
20
against franchisors.2

employees against employers,

or by franchisees

In such cases, the employer or the franchisor is in a particularly advan-

tageous position to pressure potential class members to opt out or to
release their claims. The class opponent inthese cases has the advan-

tage of day-to-day contact with potential members of the class, as well
of releases
as a superior bargaining position. Consequently, solicitation
22
and requests to opt out has been a common occurrence.

16. Handler, Yhe Shffi from Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in Antitrust Suits-The
Twenty-ThirdAntitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv.1, 9 (1971).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) requires as a prerequisite to a class action that "the class [be] so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable."
Courts have been unwilling to establish rigid numerical cutoff points for satisfying the
numerosity requirement, though some guidelines at the extremes have emerged. A class action is
not proper when there are only seven other potential class members. Hiss v. Hampton, 338 F.
Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.D.C. 1972). On the other hand, a class potentially including over 650 members clearly meets the numerosity requirement. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722,
725 (N.D. Cal. 1967). Between these extremes, the guidelines are not clear. Courts have held that
a class of 26 members does not satisfy the numerosity requirement, Moreland v. Rucker Pharmacal Co., 63 F.R.D. 611, 614 (W.D. La. 1974), while a class of 35 to 70 members may be properly
certified, Fidelis Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 293 F. Supp. 164, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Thus, a class
opponent who is able to persuade even a few potential class members to opt out or release their
claims may in these marginal cases be able to defeat the entire class action.
18. E.g., American Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 572 (D. Md. 1974) (class opponent
sought to offer compromise to individual class members).
19. E.g., Matarazzo v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 62 F.R.D. 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (defendant
obtained from members of class statements that they intended to release their claims).
20. See, e.g., Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979); Coles v. Marsh, 560
F.2d 186 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,434 U.S. 985 (1977).
21. See, e.g., Matarazzo v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 62 F.R.D. 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Griesler
v. Hardee's Foods Sys., Inc., 1973 Trade Cas. 1 74,455 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 647 (E.D.N.Y.), modfed, 55 F.R.D. 50
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), appeal dismissed,455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972).
22. In one case, the court found no coercion when the class opponent obtained statements
from potential class members that they intended to release the opponent from all claims.
Matarazzo v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 62 F.R.D. 65, 69 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Greisler v.
Hardee's Foods Sys., Inc., 1973 Trade Cas. 74,455 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Such tactics, however, are
not always effective. See Moss v. Lane Co., 50 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. Va. 1970) (court refused to
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The final problem of abuse in class actions is that of misrepresentation of the benefits and drawbacks of class suits. As discussed earlier,
class proponents and class opponents both have an interest in potential
class members' joining or opting out of the suit.2 3 In order to influence
potential class members, either side may be tempted to make misleading statements. For example, in one case the class attorney accompanied the court-ordered notice with an unauthorized letter. The court
characterized this action as "improper . . .since there are inferences

not reflect accurately the
which might easily be drawn from it which do
'2 4
legal position of the members of the class."

Many courts fear that simple reference to the court in a communication may be misleading to the recipients. Potential class members
may perceive references to the court or to the title of25the action as an
expression of judicial support for the claim asserted.
B.

Responses.

In an effort to prevent or remedy these potential and actual abuses,
some courts have gone so far as to deny class certification when abuses
of the class device were shown.2 6 However, other courts consider this

remedy too drastic and harmful primarily to unnamed class members

who have not participated in any abusive practices. 2 7 Other remedies
less drastic than denial of certification have been suggested, including
remedial notice to class members 28 or disciplinary action against the
attorney.2 9 These after-the-fact remedies, however, have been criti-

cized as ineffective to combat the abuses. Critics fear that remedial
dismiss suit even after defendant employer secured affidavits from all employees disclaiming any
authority to commence suit).
23. See notes 7-21 supra and accompanying text.
24. Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 622, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
25. See MANUAL pt. 1, § 1.41, at 47.
26. See Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1021
(N.D. Tex. 1972), aft'don othergrounds, 482 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973) (class certification denied
when named representatives solicited); Taub v. Glickman, 14 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 847 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (class status denied when counsel sent nonapproved letter characterized as attempt to stir up
litigation); Korn v. Franchard Corp., [1970] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 92,845 (S.D.N.Y.) (class
decertified because, inter alia, plaintiffs attorney sent letter to all class members soliciting their
participation in separate suit), rev'd, 456 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1972) (former attorney had withdrawn
from all connection with case).
27. See Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 622, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(motion to dismiss a class action for misleading statements denied on grounds that statute of
limitations had run and unnamed class members would be barred); accord, Flaksa v. Little River
Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885 (5th Cir.) (dismissal is drastic remedy and should be used only
in extreme circumstances), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 928 (1968).
28. Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 1972).
29. .Id.
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notice may not undo the ill effects of an abusive practice, 30 that class
members may opt out, because of misleading notice, before remedial
notice is given, 31 or that the expense of the new notice may be so high
32
that it would be impossible to correct the erroneous information.
Similarly, disciplinary actions taken against attorneys cannot reverse
the effects of misleading notice, and this remedy will not prevent solicitation by named class members.
In response to these perceived failings of the intermediate remedies and in order to anticipate and prevent abuses, the Federal Judicial
Center promulgated its proposed local rule. This rule is aimed at
preventing abuses, rather than curing them, through the imposition of a
local rule or order "forbidding unapproved direct or indirect written
and oral communications by formal parties or their counsel with potential and actual class members who are not formal parties. '33 The proposed local rule grants exceptions for
(1) Communications between an attorney and his client or a prospective client, who has on the initiative of the client or the prospective
client consulted with, employed or proposed to employ the attorney,
or (2) communications occurring in the regular course of business or
in the performance of the duties of a public office or agency (such as
the Attorney General) which do not have the effect of soliciting representation by counsel or misrepresenting the status, purposes or effect of the action and orders therein. Nor does the rule forbid
communications protected by a c6nstitutional right. However, in the
latter instance the person making the communication shall within
five days after such communication file with the Court a copy of such
and substantially comcommunication, if in writing, or an accurate 34
plete summary of the communication if oral.
Thus, the Manual establishes a comprehensive "gag order" requiring prior approval of all communications other than those specifically
excepted. The authors of the proposed rule, however, set out recommendations for the use of the rule in order to temper its restrictive effect on speech. The Manual rule contemplates that hearings on
proposed communications will be handled promptly, 35 and that
30. Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 782, 792 n.10 (E.D. La. 1977), appeal
dismissed, 579 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1978).

31. MANUAL pt. I, § 1.41, at 2 (West Supp. 1978).
32. Id. § 1.41, at 3.

33. MANUAL pt. I, § 1.41, at 47 (emphasis in original).
34. Id. pt. II, § 1.41, at 263.

35. Id. pt. I, § 1A1, at 48-49. The actual protective effect of this requirement of prompt
action, however, may be questionable. In one recent case, a hearing on plaintiffs motion for leave

to communicate with potential class members was delayed for over a month. During this period,
defendant was allowed to solicit settlements actively. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249,
1267 (5th Cir. 1979) (Godbold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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nonabusive communications will be freely allowed. 36 Additionally, it
suggests that in exceptional cases in which class members do not understand considerations affecting their interests, a court may authorize
miscellaneous communication by counsel for representative parties
without express prior approval. 37 The effectiveness of these limitations
is open to question, however, particularly since these suggestions are
not a part of the text of the proposed local rule. Only the text has been
38
adopted substantially verbatim by many courts.
This proposed local rule has found widespread approval. Several
district courts have adopted local rules based upon the Manual's proposed rule.39 Further, courts that have not specifically adopted the rule
40
have nonetheless often based orders upon the proposed local rule.
Needless to say, these local rules have not gone unchallenged. The
preferred position of first amendment freedoms insures that constitutional attacks will be made on gag orders, because of their obvious inhibition of speech. Other attacks have focused on the statutory
authority of the district courts to promulgate the rules and orders.
These attacks, while not uniformly successful, expose problems with
the operation of gag rules that deserve attention.
II.

STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND POLICY CONFLICTS

The most notable successful attack on a local gag rule came in the
case of Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp.,4 1 which held that the district court lacked the statutory authority to promulgate a local gag
rule.4 2 The Third Circuit found that the rule was both a regulation of
36. MANUAL pt. I, § 1.41, at 49.
37. Id. at 48.

38. See note 39 infra.
39. See, e.g., S.D. FLA. R. 19; N.D. GA. R. 221.2-.3; N.D. ILL. R. 22; E.D. LA. R. 2.12; D.
MD. R. 20; M.D.N.C.R. 17(b)(6); S.D. OHIO R. 3.9.4; W.D. WASH. R. 23(g).
40. E.g., Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979); Vance v. Fashion Two
Twenty, Inc., 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1513 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F.
Supp. 722, 728 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
41. 508 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,423 U.S. 832 (1975). For a complete discussion
of the Rodgers decision, see 88 HARV. L. REv. 1911 (1975).
42. W.D. PA. R. 34(d), the local rule involved in Rodgers, provides:

No communication concerning such action shall be made in any way by any of the
parties thereto, or by their counsel, with any potential or actual class member, who is not
a formal party to the action, until such time as an order may be entered by the Court
approving the communication.
The Rodgers court took care to note that the local rule it was considering did not contain the
exemptions currently embodied in the Manuals proposed rule. See 508 F.2d at 164-65 n.18. The

same court later ruled upon an order restricting communications that was modeled upon the Manual's rule. It also found this less restrictive rule invalid. Coles v. Marsh, 560 F.2d 186 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied,434 U.S. 985 (1977).
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the general practice of law 43 and inconsistent with the policies underlying Rule 23. 44 According to the court, these findings placed the local
rule beyond the rulemaking authority granted to district courts in Rule
8345 and 28 U.S.C. § 2071.46
The Rodgers court first noted that the local rule was adopted in
order to prevent barratry. 47 The court characterized the rule as an attempt to regulate the practice of law, rather than the conduct of attor48
neys before the court, and thus beyond the district court's power.
This distinction is apparently based on the limitation of a district
court's rulemaking powers to the promulgation of rules "governing [the
district court's] practice" 49 and "rules for the conduct of [the court's]
business. ' 50 Yet local rules that indirectly regulate attorney conduct
have been adopted and upheld.5 ' Some courts find authority for such
regulations governing ethical practices in the court's power to control
the admission of attorneys to practice before the court.5 2 This distinction drawn by the Rodgers court has not been followed consistently,
53
and it is not a very promising avenue of attack on local gag rules.
43. 508 F.2d at 163.
44. Id.
45. FED. R. CIv. P. 83 provides in part that "[e]ach district court by action of a majority of
the judges thereof may from time to time make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules."
46. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976) provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act
of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules
shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed by the
Supreme Court."
47. 508 F.2d at 163.
48. Id. at 163-64.
49. FED. RULE CIV. P. 83. See note 45 supra.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976). See note 46 supra.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570 (1958) (local rule aimed at preventing
solicitation of personal injury litigation by nonresident attorneys); Schlesinger v. Teitelbaum, 475
F.2d 137 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1111 (1973) (schedule of contingent fees for use in personal injury actions); DeParcq v. United States Dist. Court, 235 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1956) (local
rule required nonresident attorneys to associate with local counsel to prevent client solicitation).
52. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 1956) (noting the court's
power to refuse to allow attorneys engaging in solicitation to appear before the court); Shelley v.
Maccabees, 184 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 818 (1961) (motion to disqualify based upon alleged violation of Canons of Professional Ethics, which were adopted as
"general rule[s]" of the court).
53. But see Coles v. Marsh, 560 F.2d 186 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977), in which
the same circuit relied at least partially on this rationale in invalidating a portion of a gag order.
The limits of the district courts' power to promulgate rules have not been clearly drawn. The
Rodgers court cited Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 307 F.2d 729 (3d Cir.), cer. denied, 371 U.S.
888 (1962), as support for its proposition that courts have no general authority to regulate the
practice of law. 508 F.2d at 163. Gamble held that the imposition of monetary penalties upon
counsel was beyond the rulemaking authority of the local court. The imposition of such fines has,
however, been upheld in similar circumstances. See In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir. 1976).
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The second ground for the Rodgers decision was that the local rule
conflicted with the policy underlying Rule 23, which the court stated is
"a policy in favor of having litigation in which common interests, or
common questions of law or fact prevail, disposed of where feasible in
a single lawsuit."' 54 To accomplish this purpose, class attorneys and
parties must be able to assess the merits of their claim and the possibility of class certification.55 The mere existence of a gag rule probably
limits this evaluation of the claim since an attorney may be less willing
to attempt to communicate when the proposed communication must
always be cleared with the court. Additionally, even when permission
to communicate with the class is sought and granted, the possibility of
open-ended, responsive discussions with class members is hindered by
the rule,56 thereby decreasing the potential informative value of class
communications. The prior approval requirement of gag rules also
tends to chill discovery by class members, arguably in contravention of
57
the wide-ranging discovery policy embodied in the Federal Rules.
Potential class members often also need to obtain information from the
class counsel or parties in order to make an enlightened decision about
whether or not to opt out or execute a release of claim.5 8 A denial of
communication may be especially egregious in the not uncommon case
in which class opponents are permitted to solicit settlements or releases
while named class parties and attorneys are under a gag rule.5 9
The class opponent may also have valid reasons for wishing to
communicate with class members without prior court approval. The
54. 508 F.2d at 163. Other courts and commentators, however, have gone much further in
their views of the policy goals of Rule 23. One court, for example, suggested that named parties

be permitted to solicit funds from other members of the class in order to carry out the purposes of
the class action. Norris v. Colonial Commercial Corp., 77 F.R.D. 672, 673 (S.D. Ohio 1977); see
88 HARv. L. REv. 1911, 1918 (1975).
55. See 88 HARv. L. REv. 1911, 1917-18 (1975).
56. See Killiam v. Kroger Co., 24 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1315 (S.D. Ohio 1978).

While it is theoretically possible for an attorney or party repeatedly to seek permission to
communicate with the class in order to engage in responsive discussions, both class attorneys and

opponents would more likely limit communications than engage in the cumbersome process of
presenting each communication to the court for clearance.
57. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action").
58. See, e.g., Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249, 1269-70 (5th Cir. 1979) (Godbold, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59. See Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249, 1258-59 n.9 (5th Cir. 1979); Rodgers v.
United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975). While
potential class members may communicate with counsel at the potential party's request, such a

solution is problematical at best. The potential member must first determine who the attorneys
are and where they are located, while the attorneys are not allowed to disseminate this information without prior approval. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249, 1269-70 (5th Cir. 1979)

(Godbold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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opponent may wish to engage in discovery regarding the merits of class
certification; this discovery is hindered by requiring the opponent to
acquire court approval of each discovery request. Further, since class
normal business
actions are often brought by employees or franchisees,
60
communications may be hampered by a gag rule.
While this policy conflict analysis has some appeal, it is subject to
two serious reservations. First, courts have been hesitant to strike
down local rules as inconsistent with the Federal Rules unless faced
with direct textual conflict. 61 Thus, since any conflict that exists here is
a matter of policy rather than of text, the local rule may be immune to
attack. Nevertheless, a few courts have been willing to strike down local rules that, while not textually in conflict with federal rules, unduly
hamper the effectuation of federal policies. 62 This approach is preferable to the narrow "textual conflict" approach, but the degree of its acceptance, and hence the likelihood of striking down gag orders as
inconsistent with the policies of the Federal Rules, is uncertain.
The second and more important reservation lies in the fact that
there is no consensus about the purpose of the class action device.
The basic controversy remains whether the proper goal for the class
action should be limited to the minimum one of providing a shortcut to otherwise multitudinous litigation, or on the other hand,
one of opening court access to
should be extended to the maximum
63
otherwise nonlitigable claims.

Commentators taking the former view of the class action procedure
tend to emphasize the potential unfairness of the class action device to
class opponents and to criticize the use of the class action as a means of
solicitation. 64 Courts accepting this view would be much less likely to
60. See Local 734, Bakery Drivers Pension Fund Trust v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 57 F.R.D 1, 2 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
61. See, eg., CoIgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (local rule providing for six-man jury in

civil cases not inconsistent with Rule 48 since federal rule does not specifically guarantee a jury of
12); Darlington v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 261 F.2d 903 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 992
(1959) (local rule providing for dismissal of action on court's motion not inconsistent with Rule
41(b) providing for dismissal on motion of defendant).
62. See Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968) (rule limiting practice of nonresident
attorneys held invalid as applied because it prevented free legal services in civil rights cases);
Brown v. City of Meridian, 356 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1966) (technical requirements of local rules
should not be enforced when requirements would operate to deprive petitioners of effective access
to federal courts); Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1964) (local rules may not
operate so as to abridge rights of litigants to use federal courts).
63. 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrICE 1 23.02(1), at 42 (2d ed. 1979).
64. Compare Ford, supra note 13, at 514 n.64 (suggesting that class attorneys be allowed to
suggest to class representatives that they informally solicit others to join the litigation) andKalven
& Rosenfield, The ContemporaryFunction fthe ClassSuit, 8 U. CHi. L. REv. 684, 714-15 (1941)

(urging that goal of class suit is to allow representation of claims that would not otherwise be
brought because of litigation economics) with Simon, supra note 2, at 38-39.
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strike down gag orders, because they would view the orders as insuring
"fairness," rather than hampering the effectuation of Rule 23. Nevertheless, there is consensus at least that Rule 23 was promulgated to
allow more efficient litigation of closely related claims. 65 Given the
possibility that the imposition of broad gag rules may hinder the
achievement of this objective, 66 the continuing utility of these rules
must be carefully evaluated.
Even if it is conceded that the courts enjoy this statutory authority
to promulgate gag rules and that such rules are consistent with the policies of the Federal Rules, the degree to which gag rules are effective in
achieving their stated objectives should be examined. One of the major
abuses of the class action device is attorney solicitation of individuals
to become named parties. 67 Yet gag orders, which are entered only
upon the filing of a class action, cannot reach this prefiling activity.
Similarly, gag rules or orders do not reach actions taken by class parties
to "drum up" support prior to filing. Finally, both class parties and
opponents may use other practices not reached by gag orders to achieve
the ends the gag order is designed to prevent. For example, the mere
filing of a counterclaim may serve the same purpose of decreasing
68
numerosity as would the active solicitation of requests to opt out.
When the minimal utility of these gag rules that fail to stop abuses
of the class action is weighed against the harms that result from hindering the policies of Rule 23, the desirability of gag rules and orders becomes questionable. As these restrictions on communications come
under increasing constitutional attack, they will receive even greater
scrutiny.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

Several cases have unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality
of class action gag orders. Two cases challenged the orders as over65. See Advisory Committee Notes, Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 95, 102-03 (1966) (purpose of Rule
23 is to "achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to

persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results").
66. See text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
67. See MANUAL pt. L § 1.41, at 50 & n.35.
68. See Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 485, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(noting that "the right to counterclaim is readily subject to abuse as a tactical device to encourage
plaintiffs to opt out"). An unnamed class member may prefer to withdraw from the class suit
rather than to subject himself to the court's jurisdiction to determine a counterclaim against him.
The defense of even a frivolous counterclaim would require a class member to incur legal fees not
properly shared with other class members.
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broad and as unconstitutional prior restraints on speech. 69 Another
case challenged the local rule as an infringement upon politically expressive speech. 70 In order to evaluate the validity of these first amend-

ment challenges to local gag orders, it is necessary first to examine the
standard of scrutiny applied to restrictions on communications in simi71
lar contexts.

The initial inquiry is whether the order constitutes a prior restraint

on speech. This determination is vital because "prior restraints on
speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable in-

fringement on First Amendment rights,"' 72 carrying a "heavy presumption" against the validity of the restraint.73 The majority of courts
considering whether judicial orders limiting communications are prior

restraints have concluded that the gag orders on parties or counsel are
not prior restraints. 74 The cases offer two reasons for this conclusion.
First, courts have recognized that protecting the fairness of the judicial
process is a substantial interest that could be impaired if litigants and
their counsel were to communicate without restriction. 75 Courts so rea-

soning regard restriction on communication by parties as an acceptable

alternative, less restrictive than restraints upon the press. 76 Conse-

quently, judicial gag orders are seen as an alternative to, rather than a
species of, prior restraint. Courts using this rationale to distinguish judicial gag orders from prior restraints could note that the distinction
was developed in criminal rather than civil cases, and that it should not

be applied unthinkingly in the class action context. Although the
strong state interest in the fairness of the judicial process has been a

major factor in the approval of restrictions on communications in crim69. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979); Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc.,
433 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. La. 1977), appeal dismissed,579 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1978).
70. Brown v. Gillette Co., 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 372 (D. Mass. 1975).
71. Few cases directly discuss the appropriate standard of scrutiny for class action gag orders.
Instead, most instances of judicial restrictions on communications have involved orders or rules
forbidding extrajudicial communications by attorneys in order to preserve an atmosphere conducive to a fair trial.
72. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
73. See, e.g., Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
74. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 183-86 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248-49 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,427 U.S. 912 (1976); Society of Professional Journalists v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182, 1188-89 (D.S.C. 1977), cert. denied,434 U.S. 1022
(1978); Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137, 1152 (E.D. Va. 1976), af'dinpar and
rev'd in partsub nom. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979).
75. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
76. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 & n.8 (1976); id. at 601 n.27 (Brenconcurring).
nan, J.,
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inal cases, 77 this interest is appreciably weaker in civil cases. The strict
constitutional demands of impartiality and fairness are attenuated in
civil cases; at the same time, it is likely that a gag order in a civil case
will restrict expression for a much greater length of time.78 Thus, restrictions that can be justified in criminal proceedings may well be unjustifiable in civil class actions. Additionally, this distinction was
developed to uphold judicial restrictions on extrajudicial comments,
rather than to proscribe discussion with potential class members. Although unlimited communication with the class may be abused, any
harmful results are likely to be less serious than the feared result of
extrajudicial comment-impairment of the ability to impanel an impartial jury.
Second, courts have noted that one hallmark of judicial orders
characterized as prior restraints is that individuals charged with violating them may not challenge the constitutionality of the orders as a defense to contempt. 79 In contrast, several courts have attempted to
reduce the restrictive effect of orders limiting communications by parties and counsel by holding that the constitutionality of these orders
may be challenged as a defense to a charge of their violation.80 This
provision for constitutional challenge is thought to lessen the "chilling"
effect of gag orders, because the speaker will not be forced blindly to
obey the order to preserve his right to challenge its constitutionality.
One commentator, however, has questioned whether this procedural
innovation will notably lessen the chilling effect of the orders. 81 Gag
orders are aimed at only the particular individuals before the court,
77. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350-51 (1966); United States v. Tijerina, 412
F.2d 661, 667 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969).
78. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 193 n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 258 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
79. See, e.g., In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 184 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
80. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (3d Cir. 1975), cerl. denied,
427 U.S. 912 (1976); In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111, 113-14 (7th Cir. 1971); Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 782, 789 (E.D. La. 1977), appealdismissed,579 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1978);
Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137, 1152 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd inpart andrev'din
part sub nom. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979).
The rationale offered for this distinction is that gag rules are a product of a court's "legislative," rather than "adjudicative," role. A gag rule, therefore, is not issued as a result of a dispute
between adversaries before the court, but rather as a general regulation akin to a statute. In re
Oliver, 452 F.2d 111, 113-14 (7th Cir. 1971). Under this view, challenges to the constitutionality of
such rules may be made in prosecutions for their violation, just as statutes may be challenged.
Courts taking this position hold that the collateral bar rule, which precludes one charged with
violating a judicial order from raising the order's unconstitutionality as a defense to a contempt
citation, does not apply in these cases. For an illustration of the operation of the collateral bar
rule, see Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
81. L. TRiaE, AMERICAN CONSTrrrONAL LAW 726 n.2 (1978).
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creating a much greater likelihood that violation will be detected and
punished.8 2 This increased likelihood of punishment is likely to
counteract any decrease in deterrent effect caused by allowing constitutional challenges to be raised.
Although courts have not deemed gag orders to be presumptively
invalid as are prior restraints, they have subjected them to careful scrutiny. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia applied the following test:
Initially, the trial court must determine whether a particular
protective order in fact restrains expression and the nature of that
restraint....
The court must then evaluate such a restriction on three criteria:
the harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and serious; the
restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there
must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest which
intrudes less directly on expression.
In assessing the propriety of a protective order in each case .
and make the necessary findings on each
the trial court must consider
83
element of the standard.
An examination of class action gag orders under each prong of this test
clearly illustrates the constitutional difficulties raised.
A.

The Nature of the FirstAmendment Interests Implicated

Analysis of the propriety of gag orders in class actions requires an
awareness of the Supreme Court's recent attempts to categorize "types"
of speech and their corresponding levels of first amendment protection.
A recent decision considering restrictive orders discussed this categorization process: "First amendment interests will vary according to the
type of expression subject to the order. An order restraining publication of official court records open to the public, or an order restraining
political speech, implicates different interests than an order restraining
commercial information. '8 4 In a series of recent cases outside the class
action context, the Supreme Court has granted heightened first amendment protection to litigation-related activities. These cases are of importance to the class action gag order problem because the activities in
82. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 184 n. 15 (D.C. Cir. 1979); L. TRiBE, supra note 81, at 726 n.2.
83. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 191-92 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (footnotes omitted); cf.Waldo v.
Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 782,788 (E.D. La. 1977), appealdismissed,579 F.2d 642 (5th
Cir. 1978) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U S.415, 433, 438 (1963)) ("the governmental interests
being weighed in balance [must] be 'compelling' and be furthered only by regulation drawn with
'narrow specificity' ").
It must be emphasized that this is only the general standard to be applied. As will be discussed later, the spec/fc implementation of the standard is a matter of considerable controversy.
See notes 116-17 infra and accompanying text.
84. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (footnotes omitted).
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question in these cases resemble the solicitation and other communications restricted by gag orders.
The litigation-activity cases recognize two situations that give rise
to first amendment protection, each of which occurs frequently in class
actions. One group of cases emphasizes the importance of protecting
speech that stems from the litigation activities of politically motivated
groups, or litigation that advances political goals. In NAACP v. Button85 and In re Primus86 the Court found that the nonprofit organizations involved engaged in litigation as a form of political expression
and political association. Solicitation of litigation in such circumstances constituted expressive and associational conduct entitled to substantial first amendment protection. These cases stand in stark contrast
to Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,8 7 where the Court upheld a
sanction imposed upon an attorney for improper solicitation. The
Court drew an important distinction between a lawyer's mere in-person
solicitation of remunerative employment and similar actions that also
involved political expression, exercise of associational freedom, or the
rendering of mutual assistance in asserting legal rights.88 Because of
the different first amendment interests implicated in these cases, substantially different levels of constitutional scrutiny were employed. 89
In a second series of cases, the Court has held that "collective ac/ivity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment." 90 Despite
arguments that the unions' activities constituted solicitation 91 and the
unauthorized practice of law,92 the Court allowed unions to engage attorneys to litigate members' claims 93 or actively to seek out members
85. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
86. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).

87. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
88. Id. at 458-59.

89. In Ohralik,upon finding that the attorney's actions were not clothed with substantial first
amendment interests, the Court upheld the application of rules prohibiting solicitation "under
circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent." 436 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added). In contrast, the politically expressive solicitation involved in Primus could be pro-

scribed only upon a showing that the "activity infact involved the type of misconduct at which
South Carolina's broad prohibition is said to be directed." 436 U.S. at 434 (emphasis added).
90. United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971) (emphasis added); see UMW

v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377
U.S. 1 (1964).
91. United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 578 (1971); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 2, 6 n.10 (1964).
92. UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 218 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Train-

men v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 2 (1964).
93. UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
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with potential claims and recommend specific attorneys. 94 Though ac-

knowledging the state's strong interest in regulating the practice of
law, 95 the Court held that this interest did not outweigh the "basic right
to group legal action."'96 Broad rules enacted to protect the public and

the administration of justice were not allowed to hinder group efforts to
vindicate legal rights, absent a showing of more than a possibility of
97
harm.
These cases recognizing first amendment protection for litigation-

related activities, including solicitation and group discussion of claims,
are of great importance in the class action context. Class actions are
often brought to vindicate civil rights, and are litigated by groups, such

as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People or
the American Civil Liberties Union, that engage in litigation as a form

of political expression. 98 Also, class actions are often brought by "protected" associations, such as unions.99 Button and its progeny suggest
that gag rules, insofar as they serve to inhibit solicitation of parties and
to forestall the class members from "helping and advising one an-

other,"' ° may not be applied constitutionally without a finding of
harm in fact.' 0 ' However, gag rules, by their very nature, apply in all
cases, not merely upon a finding of an evil the state may proscribe.

Additionally, gag orders are often entered in cases without a finding
that abuses are either present or imminent.10 2 Button and its progeny

in cases in which expresdemand that such a determination be made
03
sive or associational interests are present.'

94. United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Virginia, 377 U.S 1 (1964).
95. UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
96. United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971).
97. UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222-23 (1967).
98. See, e.g., Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979); Coles v. Marsh, 560
F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,434 U.S. 985 (1977); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508
F.2d 152, 156 & n.5 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975).
99. See, e.g., Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 782, 786-87 (E.D. La. 1977),
appealdismissed,579 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1978) (class action brought by property owners' association; collective right of an organizational membership to achieve effective judicial access recognized); Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379, 381 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(special right of union's counsel to discuss pending class action with union members upheld as
protected by "the right of associations, including labor unions, to advise members of their rights
and of ways to vindicate them").
100. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 5 (1964).
101. See note 89 supra.
102. E.g., Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249, 1267-68 (5th Cir. 1979) (Godbold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103. Indeed, this requirement of a finding of specific harm may not be avoided by recitation of
potential abuses of the class action. "[L]aws which actually affect the exercise of these vital rights
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In contrast, the purely "commercial" solicitation involved in
Ohralik may be proscribed by the state upon a finding of potential
harm. It is important to note, however, that the communication fore-'
closed by gag rules is not purely commercial speech proposing commercial exchanges; the communications typically include valuable
information and advice.1 °4 The Court has noted a distinction between
"pure" commercial speech and commercially motivated speech that
also contains information and opinion.105 Such "mixed" communica0 6 It
tions are given greater protection than purely commercial speech.
thus appears that any determination of the strength of the first amendment interests opposed to the imposition of a gag order must b*e based
upon a careful examination of the motives and nature of the class and
10 7
the character of the expression sought to be made.
B. Harm Posedby the Dissemination.
After a conclusion that class action solicitation and communication may enjoy first amendment protection, the question becomes
whether these activities have effects that are sufficiently harmful to justify restrictions on otherwise protected speech. One asserted goal of
gag orders, the protection of the fairness of the judicial process, is
clearly a "substantial interest."'1 8 Courts considering gag orders must
evaluate whether abuses likely to occur in class actions pose an actual
threat to the fairness of the process.109
The potential for harm to the judicial process through abuse of the
cannot be sustained merely because they were enacted for the purpose of dealing with some evil

within the State's legislative competence, or even because the laws do in fact provide a helpful
means for dealing with such an evil." UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).

104. In fact, the Court in Ohralk took care to note the distinction between solicitation and the
dissemination of information:
[N]either of the Disciplinary Rules here at issue prohibited appellant from communicat-

ing information to these young women about their legal rights and the prospects of obtaining a monetary recovery, or from recommending that they obtain counsel. .

..

The

Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from giving unsolicited legal advice; it proscribes the
acceptance of employment resulting from such advice.
436 U.S. 447, 458 (1978).
105. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) (advertisement "contained factual
material of clear 'public interest'... [and] involve[d] the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion").
106. .d. at 820-22.
107. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978).
108. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The need to protect the administration
ofjustice from "abuses, oppression and injustice," Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 144 (1888), has
long been recognized.
109. "Freedom of discussion should be given the widest range compatible with the essential
requirement of the fair and orderly administration of justice." Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.

331, 347 (1946).
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class action device will vary widely depending on the nature of the
case. Class actions are sometimes brought by the state or an agency of
the state." 0 In such cases, there is no risk of solicitation of fees. 11 ' The
risk that fee solicitation will occur is also minimal when actions are
brought by nonprofit organizations.' 1 2 The oft-expressed fear that an
attorney will "sell out" a client's interest and settle in favor of a quick
recovery is also less likely to be borne out in these cases, as the attorney
will receive no monetary gain by such actions. 13 In such cases, the risk
of harmful attorney-client conflict of interest flowing from solicitation
is minimal. Another asserted danger in class actions, efforts by class
opponents to persuade class members to opt out or settle, may be especially acute in employee-employer or franchisee-franchisor class actions," 4 but of minimal danger in other situations. Further, the very
existence of an organization or association formed or used to litigate

class action suits may provide a substantial measure of protection
against coercive efforts by the class opponent. 1 5 Given the widely varying potential for abuse, courts should not reach general conclusions
about the harms of class action communication. A court must carefully
examine the circumstances of a particular class action before it may
determine the harms threatened by unrestricted communications with
potential class members.
When analysis of a particular class action situation indicates that
harms may result, the question then is whether the harms are sufficient
to justify restrictions. The courts have developed two formulations of
110. See, eg., Ohio v. Richter Concrete Corp., 69 F.R.D. 604 (S.D. Ohio 1975); EEOC v. Red
Arrow Corp., 392 F. Supp. 64 (E.D. Mo. 1974); EEOC v. Mobil Oil Corp., 362 F. Supp. 786 (W.D.
Mo. 1973).
111. At least one court has recognized this distinction between the "typical" class action and
one brought by the state:
Further, we agree with the plaintiff that the thrust of § 1.41 of the Manual for Complex
Litigation ... is aimed at "non-public attorneys whose interest in solicitation centers on
the aggrandizement of fees," not at public attorneys whose remuneration is based upon
"a set salary paid by the State."
Ohio v. Richter Concrete Corp., 69 F.R.D. 604, 607 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (citations omitted).
112. Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 420 (1963) (NAACP attorneys not allowed to accept
fees from litigants or other sources).
113. C id. at 442-43 (1963):
There has been no showing of a serious danger here of professionally reprehensible conflicts of interest which rules against solicitation frequently seek to prevent. This is so
partly because no monetary stakes are involved, and so there is no danger that the attorney will desert or subvert the paramount interests of his client to enrich himself or an
outside sponsor.
114. See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
115. In a closely related context, the Supreme Court recognized that one reason for the establishment of a union's Department of Legal Counsel was to protect against "adjusters eager to gain
a quick and cheap settlement for their railroad employers." Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1964).
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the requisite degree of likelihood of harm. One group of courts re-

quires only a "reasonable likelihood" of harm as a prerequisite to the
imposition of a gag order,'1 6 while another group demands that a "serious and imminent threat of harm" be shown before comment by lawyers and parties will be restricted.' 1 7 Each test has distinct advantages.
The "reasonable likelihood" test offers greater flexibility to a court de-

signing orders to curb potential abuses. On the other hand, the "serious and imminent threat" standard offers greater protection to freedom
of expression, yet is consistent with a policy of preventing serious
abuses of the judicial process.
The dispute over which of the probability tests to apply should not
obscure an important point: courts correctly analyzing this problem
should evaluate the likelihood of actual harm. Some courts have taken

what is clearly an improper approach by balancing potential rather
thanprobable abuses against the asserted speech interests." 8 This approach permits restrictions on speech without a sufficient showing of
necessity.
C.

The Restraining Order Must be Narrowly Drawn and Precise.

It is standard first amendment doctrine that any regulation of expression must be drawn with "narrow specificity" ' 1 9 to avoid unneces-

sarily restricting constitutionally protected speech.' 20 Several recent
116. See, e.g., United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
990 (1969); Society of Professional Journalists v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (D.S.C.), a7'd
with qualfcations,556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Hirschkop v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137, 1148-52 (E.D. Va. 1976), aj'dinpartand rev'd inpart sub
nom. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979).
117. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 249, cert. denied,427 U.S. 912 (1976).
See, e.g., In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111, 114 (7th Cir. 1971); cf.CBS Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 238
(6th Cir. 1975) (clear and present danger standard applied). One case that rejected a constitutional challenge to the imposition of a gag order in a class action suit apparently utilized both
standards. See Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 782, 788, 791 (E.D. La. 1977),
appeal d rmissed,579 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting both tests with apparent approval).
118. See Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249, 1268 (5th Cir. 1979) (Godbold, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Brown v. Gillette Co., 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 372 (D. Mass. 1975).
119. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). Perhaps the best statement of the rule is the
following:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (footnotes omitted).
120. See Note, The FirstAmendment OverbreadthDoctrine,83 HARv. L. REV. 844, 853 (1970).
[A] statute broad enough to support infringement of speech, writings, thoughts, and public assemblies. . . necessarily leaves all persons to guess just what the law really means
to cover, and fear of a wrong guess inevitably leads people to forego the very rights the
Constitution sought to protect above all others.
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cases have struck down court orders restricting communication on the
grounds that the orders were not sufficiently specific.'

attacks in two recent class actions

22

21

Overbreadth

were rejected, however, primarily

because the gag rules in question incorporated the Manuals recom-

mended exemption for communications for which the communicating
party asserted constitutional protection.123 But as the dissenting judge
in Bernardv. 6uf Oil Co. 124 observed, this exemption raises problems.

The class attorneys in Bernardfound that the vagueness of the exemption created uncertainty as to whether communications without prior
court approval would be acceptable, even though they asserted the constitutional right to make them.' 25 Additionally, although the mere

"good faith" assertion of a constitutional right to make such communications should protect the communicating counsel or party, the "court
would still be entitled to inquire into the bona fides of counsel's belief."' 126 The exemption also is ambiguous in light of the entire rule:

the rule proscribes all communications, then exempts those communications for which the communicating party asserts constitutional protection.' 27 As the Supreme Court stated in Button, however, "[i]f there

is an internal tension between proscription and protection in the statute, we cannot assume that, in its subsequent enforcement, ambiguities
will be resolved in favor of adequate protection of First Amendment
rights."' 2 8 When there is tension between a broad prohibition and a
narrow exemption, it is unlikely that the exemption will eliminate the
chilling effect of the prohibition. 29 Finally, the effectiveness of this

exemption is diminished by the fact that several districts adopting the
Manuals proposed rule have not incorporated it into their versions of
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
121. See e.g., CBS Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 239-40 (6th Cir. 1975) (order in civil case held
overbroad: "According to its literal terms no discussions whatever about the case are permitted by
the persons upon whom the ban is placed-whether prejudicial or innocuous, whether subjective
or objective, whether reportorial or interpretive"); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir.
1970) (per curiam) ("an order must be drawn narrowly so as not to prohibit speech which will not
have an effect on the fair administration of justice").
122. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979); Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc.,
433 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. La. 1977), appeal disrissed,579 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1978).
123. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1979); Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates,
Inc., 433 F. Supp. 782, 792-93 (E.D. La. 1977), appealdismissed, 579 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1978).
124. 596 F.2d 1249, 1262 (5th Cir. 1979) (Godbold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
125. Id. at 1266-67.
126. Id. at 1275 (Godbold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. MANUAL pt. II, § 1.41.
128. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
129. "This provision [exempting constitutionally protected communication] does not eliminate-indeed, it highlights--the overbreadth and resultant chilling effect of the proposed rule."
88 HARv. L. REv. 1911, 1922 n.74 (1975).
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the rule.130
These criticisms of the exemption undercut any claims that it will
prevent the chilling effect of the Manuafs proposed rule on protected
communications. Insofar as the rule's sole escape clause fails ade-

quately to protect speech, the search for less restrictive alternatives to
the proposed rule's across-the-board restraint is particularly important.
D. Less Intrusive Means of Achieving the ProposedRule's Objectives.

Many commentators and courts acknowledge the possibility of
abuses of the class action procedure, but contend that these evils can be

curbed by methods less sweeping than the proposed rule's total ban on
all unapproved communications. One alternative frequently suggested
is that of redrafting the rule to prohibit only those communications that
would constitute abuses of the class action device.'31 While one court
rejected this alternative as infeasible,

orders.' 33

32

other courts have designed and

Indeed, one district court assessed
imposed more limited gag
the constitutional requirements and redrafted its rule, retaining only
specific prohibitions. 34 This local rule requires prior approval by the
court only for communications concerning:
(a) solicitation directly or indirectly of legal representation of asserted and actual class members who are not formal parties to the
class action; (b) solicitation of fees and expenses and agreements to
pay fees and expenses, from asserted and actual class members who
are not formal parties to the class action; and (c) solicitation by formal parties to the class action of requests by class members to opt out
130. E.g., S.D. FLA. R. 19(b)-(c); N.D. GA. R. 221.2-.3; S.D. Oulo R. 3.9.4.
131. See, e.g., Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249, 1274-75 (5th Cir. 1979) (Godbold, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. See Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 782, 791-92 (E.D. La. 1977), appeal
dismissed, 579 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1978). The Waldo court felt that a rule prohibiting specific
practices would be easily circumvented by parties determined to commit abusive practices:
As a practical matter, it is extremely dubious that the local rule could be drafted so as to
exhaustively define potential abuses of the class action device through unauthorized
communication with class members. Unfortunately, the ingenuity of those determined
to wrongly take advantage of the class action procedure would likely prevail over any
such attempt at prohibition by itemization. The end result would be instances of compliance with the letter of the rule even as the spirit of effective regulation was flouted.
433 F. Supp. at 791-92.
133. E.g., Belcher v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1171, 1171-72 (W.D.
Va. 1976).
The Belcher court noted that the named class plaintiffs needed to develop their case in order
to establish their discrimination claim. A limited order was entered forbidding communications
for purposes of: "(a) Soliciting fees and agreements to pay fees from class members who are not
formal parties to this action; (b) Intentionally misrepresenting the status, purposes, or effects of
this lawsuit or of any actual or potential court orders issued herein." Id. at 1172.
concurring
134. See Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249, 1274 (5th Cir. 1979) (Godbold, J.,
district judge, Southern District of
in part and dissenting in part) (discussing comments of Bue, J.,
Texas).
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in class actions under subparagraph (b)(3) of Rule 23 .... 135
These detailed rules are more difficult to draft than the Manuafs pro-

posed rule and could be circumvented by parties or counsel intent on
abusive practices. Nevertheless, such rules are less likely to "chill" constitutionally protected, nonabusive speech, and are more consistent

136
with traditional first amendment principles than the Manual's rule.

These narrowly drawn rules, however, could still infringe on first

amendment rights in some circumstances. 137 For example, a rule that
prohibits only solicitation of potential class members would remain
subject to constitutional attack when applied to a class that engages in
litigation as a means of political expression. In these instances, an even
139
more limited remedy 138 or a very narrowly drawn restrictive order

would be appropriate.
Another frequently suggested alternative is to allow unrestrained

communication and rely on corrective notices to counteract any misrepresentations.' 40 This approach is attractive primarily because it
grants the parties and counsel freedom to assess the merits of their case

through discovery and to present essential information to potential
class members. The drafters of the Manual concluded that this solution
was ineffective, 14 ' however, and it is unlikely to be adopted as the sole
42
remedy for abusive practices.'

Several other limited alternatives to an across-the-board restraint
135. S.D. TEx. R. 6.
136. Such detailed rules also eliminate much of the problem caused by restricting the access of
potential class members to information necessary to make an informed decision about whether to
opt out or sign releases. The named parties and their counsel also would gain access to information necessary to develop their case and assess the merits of class certification. See notes 54-60
supra and accompanying text.
137. See notes 98-103 supra and accompanying text.
138. See text accompanying notes 140-52 infra.
139. For instance, the court could enter an order banning communications that misrepresent
the status, purposes, or effects of the suit or orders entered therein.
140. See, e.g., Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc, 458 F.2d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 1972) ("If
class designation is granted, notice to the class members can remedy whatever misleading elements there might have been in the original letter [sent by counsel along with the court-prescribed
notice]"); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1788, at
168 (1972) ("In many cases it will be sufficient to use a second notice to correct the error and
simply assess the cost against the offending side").
141. MANUAL Pt. I, § 1.41, at 2-3 (West Supp. 1978). The drafters noted two problems in
relying on corrective notice to cure abuses. First, class members may have opted out based upon
erroneous information, and would therefore not receive the corrective notice. Second, the cost of
the new notice may be so prohibitive as to make correction of erroneous information impossible.
Id.
142. Rule 6 of the Southern District of Texas, discussed in text accompanying note 135 supra,
contains a variation of this "corrective notice" rule. Under this rule, any communication between
any formal party or counsel and potential class members that purports to represent the status,
purposes, or effects of the suit or orders therein must be filed with the court within five days. If the
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have been suggested to curb the chilling effect inherent in the Manual's
proposed rule. Traditional sanctions for unethical conduct by attorneys could be employed to control attorneys' solicitation of clients. 143
Additionally, if the class attorney has engaged in unethical behavior,
especially solicitation of the named class parties, substitution of counsel
may be an appropriate remedy. 144 Another option responds to the concern that there may be irreparable harm to class members as a result of
misleading statements during the limited period when the class members may opt out or execute releases. 45 A rule that banned unapproved communications only during this limited period could eliminate
this problem.' 46 Alternatively, if class plaintiffs showed that the defendant made misrepresentations in soliciting opt-outs, the court could
insist that the defendant send corrective notice and could require reaffirmation of the decision to opt out. If the solicitation of opt-outs destroyed class action numerosity, 14 7 the court could examine the

settlements to insure that the interests of those opting out were pro48
tected. 1
Other more limited alternatives address only certain aspects of
class action abuses. One commentator has asserted that misrepresentations by named class members or their attorneys could be corrected by
allowing the opponent's attorney to communicate directly with the
class. 149 Another method of presenting both views that reduces the
chance of harmful misrepresentation is to allow discussions with potential class members only when both parties and their counsel are present.'50 A final limited preventative device addresses the fear that mere
reference to the title of the action or the court will imply court sanction
communication violates the specific prohibitions of the rule or is misleading, the court must take
"appropriate corrective action." S.D. TEx. R. 6.
143. See Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 1972) ("ordinary remedy is disciplinary action against attorney and remedial notice to class members"); Developments in the Law-Clas.sActions, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1318, 1602 n.102 (1976); 88 HARV. L. REv.

1911, 1921 & n.66 (1975).
144. See Kom v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1208 (2d Cir. 1972).
145. See Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249, 1260 (5th Cir. 1979).
146. 88 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1921 (1975).
The advantage of this solution is that it allows greater discovery and dissemination of information during the remainder of the class suit. However, the decision to opt out is a crucial one,
and forbidding unapproved communications during this time may well force class members to
make this important decision with only limited or one-sided information.
147. See note 17 supra.
148. See American Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 572, 576 (1974).
149. Developments, supra note 143, at 1598-99.

This view runs counter to the traditional view that communications with an opposing party
may be made only through that party's counsel. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONISBILITY

DR 7-104 (1978).
150. Cf.Weight Watchers, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 50, 51 (E.D.N.Y.
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of the action.' 5' This could be avoided by requiring the parties to include a clause in all communications to potential class members or to
class opponents disclaiming any expression of opinion, direction, or
52
sanction by the court.1

Since there are so many alternatives to an across-the-board prohibition on unapproved communications, courts should be able to select

alternatives that cure or prevent abuses, but do not hinder nonabusive
communication. This would minimize the chilling effect of gag orders

on constitutionally protected communications.
E. Specffc Findings.
Several cases emphasize that the courts should be required to

make specific findings that justify an order restricting communications.
This requirement rests principally on the first amendment demand that

specific harms be proven in order to justify restraints on speech,153 al-

though some courts base this requirement upon either the limits of the

district court's power

54

or the requirement of the sound exercise of

discretion.155

Practical considerations also support the requirement that the
court make specific findings. This requirement may force the court to
engage in a careful evaluation of the circumstances of the case. This

careful, case-by-case analysis is important in applying many of the tests
and distinctions already discussed. For example, in distinguishing be-

tween "commercial" and "expressive" speech, with their corresponding
1971) (allowing contract negotiations by class opponent with members of franchisee class when
counsel for plaintiffs was present), appeal dismissed,455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972).
151. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
152. Yhi notice is not to be understoodas an expression of any opinion by this Court as to
the merits of any of the claims or defenses assertedby either side in this litigation or as to
any amount that any claimant would receive on settlement, but is sent for the sole purpose

of informing you of the pendency of this litigation and the settlement described herein so
that you can make appropriate decisions as to what steps you may wish to take in relation thereto.
Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364, 371
(E.D. Pa. 1970) (emphasis in original).
153. "We stress. . . that in each case, before entering a protective order that restricts expression, the trial judge must determine that it meets those criteria mandated by the First Amendment." In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (emphasis in original); accord,Chase v.
Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1970) ("We hold that before a trial court can limit defendants' and their attorneys' exercise of first amendment rights of freedom of speech, the record must
contain sufficient specific findings by the trial court establishing that defendants' and their attorneys' conduct is 'a serious and imminent threat to the administration ofjustice' ") (citations omitted).
154. See Coles v. Marsh, 560 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,434 U.S. 985 (1977).
155. See Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249, 1267-70 (5th Cir. 1979) (Godbold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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levels of constitutional protection, such a case-by-case analysis is
plainly necessary. 56 A court should also consider the likelihood that
the asserted abuses will actually occur. 157 Such consideration requires
a careful examination in each case and would force a court to identify
the particular abuses feared, enabling it to choose narrow remedies that
correct the abuses without infringing on constitutionally guaranteed
58
freedoms.
IV. CONCLUSION
Abuse of the class action procedure is a legitimate concern. Nevertheless, court orders and rules that restrict all unapproved communications with potential class members create a serious conflict with first
amendment values and the policies underlying Rule 23. These conflicts
are avoidable. Through a careful examination of the expressive interests asserted, as well as a realistic assessment of the potential for abusive practices present in the class action, a court can choose either a
narrowly drawn restrictive order or a method of remedying any abuses
that have already occurred. This should minimize abuses without substantially infringing on either first amendment interests or nonabusive
communications with potential class members.
Nancy T Bowen

156. The Supreme Court has noted the difficulty a court faces in distinguishing "commercial"
and "expressive" speech. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978) ("The line, based in part
on the motive of the speaker and the character of the expressive activity, will not always be easy to

draw") (citations omitted).
157. See text accompanying notes 110-18 supra.
158. See note 119 supra.

